Wildfires in Canada

While forest fires are ubiquitous across much of the Canadian landscape (an annual average of more than 7,500 fires and more than 1.9 million hectares burned over the past decade), many decades of successful fire suppression programs resulted in very limited impacts on communities during the latter half of the 20th Century.

However, the 2003 Firestorm in British Columbia caused substantial home and business losses in Kelowna and Barriere, and brought home to Canadians the fact that they were not immune to communities being directly impacted by wildfires.The 2011 events in the Slave Lake area only served to reinforce the message that many Canadian communities are similarly at risk, particularly as the wildland-urban interface continues to expand and fire activity across Canada is forecast to increase as a result of climate change. 

This was a message stated clearly in the Canadian Wildland Fire Strategy (CWFS), developed in 2005 and supported by all provincial and territorial governments across Canada, along with the federal government. The CWFS recognized that increasing future fire activity and impacts were inevitable, and that Canadian governments needed to work closely, along with an informed and involved public, to lessen future impacts, particularly on exposed communities. Despite being signed by all governments, the CWFS has not been substantially implemented due to a lack of funding.

In recognition of the significance of the wildfires that impacted Slave Lake and surrounding communities in May 2011, the Minister of Alberta Sustainable Resource Development (ASRD) established the Flat Top Complex Wildfire Review Committee in June 2011, of which we were members. The Committee was also supported by a team of wildfire experts who documented fire science and operational information related to the Flat Top Complex and provided technical advice.

The review was titled the Flat Top Complex Review as it encompassed the “fire complex” involving three fires that threatened the Slave Lake area. The review teams and Committee were formed shortly after the fires and quickly began work with on the ground data collection, as well as interviews with those involved in the firefighting response and stakeholders. Several important recommendations were made by the Committee to the Alberta government. But first, some context about the fires in Slave Lake region in May 2011.

The “Flat Top Complex” in Context

In mid-May of 2011 two high-intensity forest fires in central Alberta, driven by sustained strong winds under low relative humidity conditions, burned into a combined total of four communities (the town of Slave Lake, and the surrounding communities of Poplar Estates, Widewater and Canyon Creek). More than 500 homes and businesses were destroyed, with an estimated insured loss of $700 million. The social and emotional impacts of these fires are still being felt strongly within these communities a year later. 

A number of key factors were identified as influencing the events of May 14 and 15. Foremost among these were the sustained and extremely high wind speeds which, in combination with low relative humidity values created very dry fine fuels and high intensity crown fire development, with prolific downwind spotting. Crown fires typically have flame lengths from the ground to above the tree crowns, and often involve significant spotting, which is the transport of firebrands ahead of the main fire front. Crown fires are nearly impossible to suppress with direct attack. The high winds also hampered air operations and led to the suspension of air attack during the critical fire period on the afternoon on May 15th. A very high fire load across much of Alberta during the mid-May period made adequate resourcing of wildfires a challenge.

During the May 11-15 period a large number of significant wildfires started across the province, with sustained strong winds creating major wildfire suppression difficulties. Initial attack and sustained attack resources were quickly committed, and additional national and international resources requested. A total of 189 wildfires occurred across Alberta during this period, threatening over 23 communities/locations (e.g., camps, worksites, parks, wildfire lookouts).

In the Lesser Slave Area 52 wildfires occurred, threatening roughly 10 communities/locations. The Richardson Fire north of Fort McMurray spread 70 kilometres north in two days, eventually burning nearly 600,000 hectares. Two Lesser Slave Area wildfires were responsible for the damage to Slave Lake (Fire 65) and surrounding communities (Fires 56 and 65) started on May 14th. These fires, along with a smaller fire near Slave Lake that started on May 15th but had no impact on communities (Fire 82), were designated and managed as the Flat Top Complex.

Review Recommendations

The Committee was charged with reviewing ASRD efforts before, during and after the wildfires, and met with key stakeholders and ASRD staff, along with experts in forest fire science and operations before issuing a report and recommendations in May 2012.

The Minister of the newly formed department of Environment and Sustainable Resource Development is developing an implementation strategy in response to the Committee’s recommendations.

A number of key areas were investigated by the Committee including the long and short-term contexts of the Slave Lake event. Over the past decades, as mentioned, there have been several large fires potentially threatening Slave Lake and other communities. As a result, Alberta developed sophisticated wildfire response capabilities and a FireSmart program to reduce wildfire damage to homes and communities. In the weeks previous to the Flat Top Complex, the fire conditions in Alberta of extreme drying conditions in combination with the winds resulted in conditions for explosive fire growth over most of northeast Alberta.

The Committee considered this context as well as a broad range of potentially contributing factors. As a result seven themes with 21 recommendations were developed:

1. Wildfire prevention: the number of human-caused fires continues to increase in Alberta which adds to the challenge during extreme conditions. Enhancements in overall prevention of wildfires including industrial fires and with escalated measures during extreme conditions were recommended. In reviewing the FireSmart program, it is a significant challenge for most jurisdictions to maintain priority for FireSmart funding and community level activities. In some areas, it is also a challenge to obtain community acceptance and support for the program. This continues to leave many communities at risk in fire prone areas. The Committee recommended that a funding model be implemented that broadens engagement and a priority established to accelerate on-ground treatments.

2. Preparedness and capacity: Several challenges were experienced by response organizations in the period preceding and during the Flat Top Complex. The acceleration of fire activity across Alberta occurred at the time when many firefighters and aircraft were just coming online for start of season. The Type 1 (highly trained) firefighters quickly became committed across the province.As homes came under threat both wildland and structure firefighters were committed to saving structures. The Committee recommended earlier start dates for resources and additional crews specialized in large fires. In order to anticipate and prepare for extreme conditions capabilities to predict fire behavior were recommended as were advancing requests for assistance. The Committee also recommended a program to expand involvement of fire departments in protecting structures using the existing mutual aid network.

3. Communications: in any fast moving emergency, communications with responders and stakeholders are critical but often challenging to manage. In that regard, the committee recommended standards and training for liaison staff, enhancements to weather advisories and suppor
t for new communications technologies. As well, under rapidly expanding response organizations, dispatch systems must be capable of handling the increased volumes of communications to support command and control. The committee recommended looking at options for enhancing Alberta’s wildfire dispatch systems.

4. Organization and incident management: major events like the 2011 wildfire season test an organization and its priorities. The Committee recommended realignment of the reporting relationships for wildfire responsibilities to ensure direct lines of reporting, with regular internal assessments of strategies, priorities and procedures. As well, in the context of provincial emergency response, the Committee recommended a consistent implementation of both the Incident Command System and use of Incident Management Teams.

5. Post-wildfire business resumption: the SRD Area office and many staff were directly affected by the wildfires and associated events which significantly complicated the post-wildfire response and recovery. Given the importance of SRD operations during and following the event, there were many lessons to be learned. The Committee recommended a review of SRD business continuation plans to extend those learnings to future events.

6. Policy and legislation: policy and legislation are developed to deal with known conditions and expected situations. The 2011 wildfire season was well outside of the experiences of Alberta at the time its policies and legislation were last updated. The Committee recommended a review and appropriate update of relevant policies, procedures, acts and regulations and necessary updates to training and familiarization for staff.

7. Research and development: the 2011 wildfire season presented a number of key areas of potential new information for Alberta and other jurisdictions. The Committee recommended collaboration on research in a number of key areas, including factors contributing to fire spread and home losses, that will help prediction and prevention in the future. Another recommendation is to enhance the Presuppression Preparedness System with new information from 2011.

In addition to the recommendations, the team looked at the effectiveness of fire suppression activities over the period of ignition to containment of the Flat Top Complex fires. In the face of wide ranging opinions from the public and various experts, the Committee did not believe that alternative actions as discussed could have been safely implemented that would have guaranteed improved outcomes.

The wildfires of 2011 in Alberta and the 2003 fire season in British Columbia are considered by many wildfire experts to be a harbinger of an emerging new reality. Several factors are cited as likely contributors to a change in the risks to Canadian communities and residents in the wildland-urban interface.

Climate change is often seen as the primary driver; however, two other factors also appear to contribute. Increasing and expanding activity in Canada’s wildlands amplifies the risk of fire starts and of investments being in the way of wildfires. Canada’s forests and wildlands are changing as a result of historic wildfire exclusion so that our forests are aging especially around communities. This has exacerbated problems with forest health and increased flammability.

Wildfires will continue to make impressive and uncontrollable runs through Canadian wildlands. If the number and behavior of wildfires increase and development expands into wildlands, 2003 and 2011 type events will logically become more frequent unless significant collaborative actions are taken by all parties (government, stakeholders, public) to prepare for and to mitigate the risks. 

Peter Fuglem and Brian Stocks were members of the Flat Top Complex Wildfire Review Committee.